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Abstract 
Recent economic research has focused on the economic effects of the social environment. In the 
economic literature, important phenomena are considered, at least in part, as results of the 
individual's social environment. There is a similar revival of interest among economists who 
analyse the world of science and basic research. In this case as well, the environment plays a key 
role in the agent's behaviour. This paper makes an empirical analysis of the influence of social 
interactions on scientists' productivity. In the econometric analysis we investigate the aggregate 
importance of this phenomenon through the analysis of data on publications in four scientific fields 
of seven advanced countries. We find that social interactions among researchers have positive 
effects on a scientist's productivity and that there is a U-shaped relation between the size of a 
scientific network and individual productivity. We interpret this result as providing evidence for 
threshold externalities and increasing returns to scale. 
Keywords: scientists' productivity, increasing returns in science, social interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent economic research has focused on the economic effects of the social environment (see, e.g., 
Ackerlof, 1997; Durlauf and Young, 2001; Durlauf, 2004). In the economic literature, important 
phenomena such as educational choice, labour market participation and crime behaviour are 
considered, at least in part, as results of the individual's social environment. 
Indeed, in such a framework, individual decisions depend on those of others who are in its 
neighbourhood or in the same social group due to the influence of social interactions among 
agents1. 
This paper aims to analyze the influence of social interactions on scientists' productivity. In this 
respect, we investigate the aggregate importance of this phenomenon by analysing data on 
publications in four scientific fields of seven advanced countries. 
The hypothesis of social interactions in science finds support in economic and sociological 
literature which stresses the importance of both collective norms and network structure in basic 
research. Actually, the rules of full disclosure of new finds and their evaluation by peers make basic 
research a collective enterprise which often is referred to as Invisible College (David, 1998). 
Linkages among scientists have been investigated by several scholars (e.g., Laband and Tollison, 
2000; Newman, 2001; Rosenblat and Mobius, 2004; Goyal et al., 2006) who find the important 
evidence of the emergence of a small world in science characterized by one large component, 
within which social distance among researchers is very small, and other small components, that are 
quite isolated. Within the giant component formal and informal connections among scientists are 
very important. 
To specify the econometric model, we also refer to some theoretical propositions from Carillo and 
Papagni (2007) where a model of growth with social interactions in basic research is put forward. 
In this model a large group of researchers endowed with heterogeneous talent are engaged in a 
contest: the first to publish a new result in the field wins a prize. This event occurs with a 
probability that depends on individual effort and on the effort and ability of the other researchers. 
                                                 
1
 
Social interactions or non-market interactions are defined as interactions among agents which are direct and not 
mediated by prices (see Manski, 2000 and Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2000). A clearer definition has been provided by 
Brock and Durlauf (2001), as follows: “social interactions we refer to the idea that the utility or pay-off an individual 
receives from a given action depends on the choices of others in that individual's reference group” (Ibidem, p. 235). A 
similar revival of interest is growing among economists who analyze the world of science and basic research (Stephan, 
1996). In this case as well, the environment plays a key role in the agent's behavior. In common parlance their world is 
often referred to as the “scientific community”, stressing both its segregation and the importance of the group. 
 
Social interactions among scientists are embedded in a CES index of effort and talent of the 
community of researchers. The equilibrium solution of the model tells us that a scientist's 
productivity depends on the social environment in terms of  community size and quality of 
colleagues. Moreover, the model shows the relation between the size of a scientific network and the 
scientist's productivity can be non-monotone, with a section of the curve in which increasing 
returns emerge. 
Econometric investigation of data on articles for the fields of engineering, medicine, natural 
sciences and social sciences in seven advanced countries during the period 1988-2001 shows that 
scientists productivity depends on research in the same field performed in other countries and on 
research done in other fields by scientists in the same country. Hence, regressions show significant 
externality effects of basic research. Scale effects and increasing returns also find support in the 
regressions of publications per scientist as a quadratic function of the size of the scientific 
community by country which highlight a U-shaped relation, first decreasing and then increasing. 
We believe that our results add to the scant literature on environmental effects on the productivity 
of scientists. Some other interesting contributions come from sociology. Allison and Long (1990) 
investigate the effect of university departments on publication productivity with individual data and 
find that causality runs from department to scientist productivity. 
Long and McGinnis (1981) find similar results with reference to larger organisations such as 
universities. A recent interesting contribution to the issue from the world of economics comes from 
Carayol and Matt (2006) who study the determinants of publication productivity of faculty 
members of Louis Pasteur University. They find evidence that the quality of colleagues in 
laboratories positively affects individual performance. Carayol and Matt also deal with the issue of 
the size of the research organization but find evidence for decreasing returns to scale in the science 
sector. 
All the above papers provide important evidence for the influence of the environment, narrowly 
defined as the department, universities, etc., upon research, but do not deal with the wider context 
of the scientific community as exemplified by the notion of Invisible Colleges (David, 1998). Our 
paper seems closer to Adams and Griliches (2000) who estimate a production function of articles 
and citations on data from USA universities broken down by field. They estimate returns to scale 
and find a value lower than one, but admit that their model does not consider the effect of  research 
externalities between fields and across countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we deal with the literature that emphasizes several 
forms of social interactions in science and their consequences for its productivity. Section 3 
contains the econometric analysis, followed by our conclusions in section 4. 
2. Norms of  open science and social interactions among scientists 
 
Social interactions among researchers are a key factor for scientific knowledge production due not 
only to unintentional externality effects, which often arise in knowledge production, but also the 
norms2 which regulate the institution of  open science (David, 1988). These render scientific 
production not so much the result of a single researcher's effort, but rather the outcome of a 
cognitive process which involves the whole scientific community. 
The first norm is communalism, by which a researcher identifies with the community of scientists. 
Communalism allows science to run as a collective enterprise where everyone is expected to share 
knowledge with others. The second norm is universalism, by which the scientific community is 
open to all persons of competence regardless of their personal and ascriptive attributes. Two further 
norms are disinterest and originality: the former reinforces communalism, while the latter 
establishes that only the first discoverer of new knowledge obtains a reward. This method of 
assignation of the reward, labelled by the sociological literature as the  priority rule, makes 
scientific production a winner takes all contest and gives scientists powerful incentives to innovate 
because rewards, both in terms of recognition and resources, invariably accrue to those who 
discover things first (Merton, 1957; Dasgupta and David, 1994). The last norm is scepticism, by 
which all contributors are subject to critical analysis and a new discovery is accepted as a new 
scientific proposition only when this process of revision has occurred. 
All the above norms stress the importance of social interactions among scientists which occur 
within the scientific network. Communalism, for example, emphasises the co-operative nature of 
inquiry, stressing that the accumulation of reliable knowledge is a social process. Another 
consequence of communalism is the full disclosure of findings and methods (Dasgupta and David, 
1994), which forms a key aspect of the social and communal program of inquiry. Indeed, full 
disclosure makes disseminating and publishing the results of research particularly intense. 
Thus the social nature of scientific production becomes more effective since it makes new ideas 
available to the whole scientific community. 
Moreover, full disclosure legitimates what Merton called organized scepticism, which supports the 
expectation that all claims will be subjected to trials of replications and verifications. The norm of 
scepticism affects the capacity of the entire scientific community to attain scientific closure (David, 
2004) which is the emergence of a preponderant consensus concerning the validity or invalidity of 
particular scientific propositions. 
 
                                                 
2 These were mainly analysed by Merton (1957) and labelled with the acronym CUDOS. 
Summing up, social interactions which occur within the scientific community make scientific 
production possible, since they promote the circulation and creation of new ideas and the 
attainment of scientific closure upon a new scientific proposition. 
 
2.1 Effects of the size and features of scientific networks on scientists' productivity 
 
As we have seen, social interactions are a prerequisite for scientific production. It is thus important 
to understand what features of scientific networks favour the occurrence of social interactions 
among researchers. 
One factor is the size of the scientific network: the larger the number of scientists, the more likely 
they are to interact by participating in conferences, seminars, research groups, etc. Moreover 
collaboration between researchers, which is a particular form of social interaction, is favoured by a 
large scientific community because of a sort of a thick market externality by which, in a thick 
scientific market, it is easier to find a scientist to collaborate with. The implication is that the size of 
the scientific network may have a positive effect on the average productivity of the science sector. 
However, norms which regulate academia entail not only collaborative relations among peers, but 
also competitive ones. Indeed, as we have stressed, another fundamental norm is originality which 
ensures that only the first discoverer obtains the reward for innovation. 
This method of assigning rewards engenders particularly intense competition among scientists, 
given that the higher the number of other researchers, the lower the probability of a researcher 
being the first to arrive at an innovation and then to obtain the reward for it. This effect may reduce 
the effort of a single researcher and consequently his/her productivity. 
The above considerations imply that the size of the scientific network may have ambiguous effects 
on the average productivity of the sector, since on the one hand larger scientific networks imply 
greater social exchange among researchers with positive effects on their productivity. On the other, 
a large number of researchers increases competition, with negative effects on the productivity of 
the single researcher. If the positive effect of social interactions prevails, there could be increasing 
returns to scale, in the sense that there will be a positive relation between the size of the sector and 
its average productivity. Otherwise, if the competition effect prevails, there could be decreasing 
returns to scale by which the productivity of the individual researcher decreases as the size of the 
sector grows.  
The empirical literature on scientific research seems to confirm the prevalence of increasing returns 
to scale. Cole and Phelan (1999), for example, find a positive relation between number of scientists 
and the average number of highly cited articles per scientist3. Aizman and Noy (2007) investigate 
the extent to which scale effects account for countries' share of major prizes (such as Nobel, Fields 
and Kyoto). They find that the relation between the lagged GDP of a country, which is positively 
linked to investment in research, and its share of prizes can be explained by a quadratic function 
with positive parameters: above a certain threshold there is a ”take off” range, where the share of 
prizes increases at an accelerating rate with the relative GDP share of the country. This finding 
would confirm the hypothesis of the existence of a threshold effect and positive returns to scale 
linked to network externalities. 
Besides the size of scientific networks, it might reasonably be expected that also the manner in 
which researchers interact with one another affects the amount of social exchange due to social 
interactions and, hence, their productivity. For example, frequency and distribution of social 
interactions among agents change the intensity of social exchanges within networks of the same 
size: several and more equally distributed interactions increase the social exchange among 
scientists. In addition, homogeneity or heterogeneity is an important factor, as high homogeneity 
makes scientific closure easier to attain, although it may have perverse effects on creativity4. 
Recently, several papers have appeared which analyze the evolution of scientific networks for 
different scientific disciplines in terms of size and structure5. 
Many authors (Albert and Barabasi, 2002; Goyal et al., 2006 and Rosenblat and Mobius, 2004) 
have found an apparent trend toward a marked increase in the size of scientific networks and a 
reduction in the social distance between researchers. Goyal et al. (2006), for example, by running 
an empirical analysis on economists, found that the size of this network grew substantially over the 
period 1970-2000, while the number of non-collaborating economists declined sharply. They 
interpret these findings as evidence that the scientific network of economists is expanding and at 
the same time the social distance between them is diminishing, with a consequent increase in social 
exchange. This trend is generally explained by the sharp reduction in communication costs made 
possible by new information technologies (Kim, Morse and Zingales, 2006 and Rosenblat and 
Mobius, 2004).  
                                                 
3 More interestingly, the correlation index between the two variables was 0.86 for 24 industrialized countries and 0.55 
for a whole sample which also included less developed countries. 
4 Heterogeneity may favor creativity since more different ideas can be combined to obtain new ones (on this point see 
Weitzman, 1998). 
5 See Albert and Barabasi (2002), Ravasz and Barabasi (2003), Newman (2001) and Watts and Strogaz (1988) for 
medicine, physics and computer science, Grossman, (2002) for mathematics, Goyal et al. (2006) and Rosenblat and 
Mobius (2002) for economics. 
Although this literature provides interesting insights - both applied and theoretical - into the 
phenomenon of social interactions in scientific production, a general theory is still missing. In the 
next section we summarise the main arguments of a recent paper by Carillo and Papagni (2007) 
which aims at the theoretical analysis of social interactions in science in a general equilibrium 
model. This model provides some guidelines on the questions of the presence of increasing returns 
and externality effects in basic research that will be useful for defining of the econometric 
analysis which follows in section 3. 
 
2.2 A model of scientific production 
 
In several respects, the model of scientific production presented here follows the paper by Carillo 
and Papagni (2007), which analyses the effects on scientific production and growth rate of the 
economy produced by social interactions arising between scientists who belong to the same 
scientific community. Following Carillo and Papagni (2007), we assume that the scientific 
production consists in a contest where each scientist participates with other researchers to be the 
first to attain a new result. The winner of this race is awarded a state funded monetary prize. The 
state funds scientific research since knowledge is a pure public good which improves productivity 
in the rest of the economy. Another major assumption is that the research environment has an 
important influence on scientists’ productivity due to collective norms in the science sector. 
More particularly, we assume that the science sector is made up by a continuum of agents, indexed 
by [ ]1,0∈i , who are endowed with skills denoted by [ ]1,li δδ ∈ . Talent is distributed in the 
population according to a distribution function ( )δF . In each period the number of potential 
discoveries is limited and assumed equal to one. This assumption implies that the innovative race is 
such that a number of researchers greater than one seek the same innovation, even if only one of 
them will be the first to do so and obtain the reward6. 
This type of contest successfully captures what happens in the scientific world, where innovations 
or advances in a scientific discipline are limited, and scientific communities are often engaged with 
problems on which there is consensus as to their importance for advancing scientific knowledge. 
As we have already highlighted one important norm in science is the priority rule which only the 
first who arrives at an innovation gains the reward for it. Hence, we assume that each researcher 
participates in a collective contest where only the first to obtain the innovation has the reward m. 
                                                 
6 A race of this kind arises only when the number of innovations is limited: otherwise, each researcher would seek to 
produce a different innovation in order to maximize his/her chances of obtaining the reward (Zeira, 2003). 
 
The arrival of a new idea in the whole scientific sector is uncertain and has probability S, while the 
probability that, if an innovation occurs, individual i is the first discoverer is denoted by qi. Hence, 
the probability of success of an individual researcher is given by the probability that an innovation 
arrives in the sector multiplied by the conditional probability that the first innovator is the thi  
individual  
   Sqp ii =    (1) 
The conditional probability that the thi  individual arrives at an innovation iq  depends directly on 
the resources that the individual researcher devotes to his/her research, denoted by iii eh δ=  where 
ie   is effort, and it is an inverse function of the resources, denoted by H, that all other researchers 
devote to that same research activity: 
H
hq ii = . This implies that probability iq  can be expressed as: 
   
( ) ( )∫
= 1
l
dFh
eq iii
δ
δδ
δ   (2) 
Hence, in this model, the greater the amount of resources that other researchers invest in the job, 
the lower is the conditional probability that scientist i is the first to discover the innovation. This 
negative relation captures the intensity of competition in scientific races and is defined as the 
competition effect. 
Another crucial assumption concerns the probability of the event “one innovation occurs in the 
science sector”, which is assumed to depend on social interactions in terms of the exchange of 
knowledge among researchers. This probability may depend on two aggregate dimensions of basic 
research which should affect social interactions: one is the size of the scientific network, because 
the larger the number of agents, the more likely are interactions and collaborations that reduce the 
social distance among them. The other dimension is the quality of social interactions, because more 
frequent and more equally distributed interactions increase the social exchange among scientists 
within a given network. Such externality effects which arise in the context of basic research can be 
summarized in a CES index function of scientists effort and talent: 
  ( ) ( )
1
1 1
−




= ∫ −
χ
χ
δ
χ
χ
δδ
l
dFhsS    (3) 
 
This indicator7 captures both the effect of network size, and also the effects of changes in the 
intensity of social exchange within a given network. In fact, when 01 >
χ
, individual resources 
invested in research are complements and the network structure experiences low social exchange 
since the high h individuals cannot easily transfer their knowledge to less talented scientists, 
thereby reducing the average level of h. When 01 <
χ
, individuals are substitutes and the social 
exchange is high since the most talented scientists may more easily transfer their knowledge to the 
low h types, thereby pulling the average level of h upward. 
In every time period scientists participate in the contest for a new find by choosing the value of 
effort. This decision relies on maximizing the expected utility that is made up by the utility from 
consumption and disutility from effort on the job as follows: 
   ( ) ,,,, iiii deeRempu −= δ   (4) 
where lR δ−=1  is the size of the research sector, e  is the effort of the other researchers and m is 
the monetary reward from an innovation. From the utility function it is easy to derive that the 
optimal value of ie  depends positively on the reward from an innovation and on the probability of 
success of an individual researcher. In turn the latter ip  depends positively on the resources 
invested in research by the individual scientist. In conclusion, all variables that influence ip , also 
affect the productivity of a single researcher, either due to their direct effects, or because they 
induce an increase in the effort employed in this activity by the individual researcher. From 
equations (1), (2), (3) ip  is given by  
  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
1
−




= ∫∫
−
χ
χ
δ
χ
χ
δ
δδ
δδ
δ
l
l
dFhs
dFh
ep iii  (5) 
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This indicator was used by Benabou (1996a and 1996b) to capture the 
influence of social interactions on the formation of local human capital, 
while in the case analyzed here, the influence of the environment on the 
probability of achieving an innovation represents a social capital typical 
of the research sector that can benefit all those who belong to it. 
 
From this equation, it is easy to see that the probability of a success of an individual researcher, 
which captures the basic research productivity, is affected by two main effects of opposite sign: the 
competition effect, which reduces the probability ip  and hence also the incentive to effort, and the 
social interactions effect, which may increase it. The latter effect may be strong in environment 
made up by agents with substitute characteristics, while it is more likely to be low in communities 
where researcher interactions are made difficult by cultural or communication factors. These two 
effects are also influenced by the size of the research sector; in the two integrals in the above 
equation are both affected by the size of the research sector given by lδ−1 . This implies that the 
probability of a success of a single researcher, hence the average productivity of the science sector 
can be a non-monotone function of the number of researchers entering the race because, on one 
side, it not only reinforces competition among researchers, but it also increases the opportunities for 
social exchange in the scientific community. If competition effect prevails, there will be decreasing 
returns to scale, in the sense that average productivity declines as the number of scientists 
increases, if social interactions effect prevails there will be increasing returns to scale with an 
increasing average productivity as the number of researchers increases. 
Hence, this paper underlines the channels through which social interactions can cause increasing 
returns to scale in science sector but leaves to empirical analysis the task of identifying and 
quantifying such relationships. Actually, these results seem consistent with the evidence found by 
Aizenman and Noy (2007) and by Cole and Phelan (1999), by which increasing returns to scale in 
the science sector mainly occur in more developed countries, which have also more developed 
science sectors. 
In the following section we will investigate the relation between size, average productivity of the 
science sector and the quality of social interactions relying on international data on publications and 
expenditure on research by field. We summarize the main lines of the previous discussion in the 
following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Average productivity of basic research is an increasing function of scientists' 
remuneration; 
Hypothesis 2: Social interactions in scientific networks are significant determinants of scientists' 
productivity; 
Hypothesis 3: There could be a nonlinear relationship between average productivity of the science 
sector and its size, with increasing returns to scale if social interactions are strong enough.  
 
 
 
3. Econometric analysis of scientific publications 
 
In this section we present an econometric study of scientific production in four fields of some of the 
most industrialized countries. As is very common in the literature, the output of basic research is 
proxied by the number of articles (source: ISI-Thompson). Scientific production depends on the 
resources invested in the sector, while some indicators will be considered as proxies of the intensity 
of social exchange.  
 
3.1 Econometric model 
 
In order to test the main predictions of the model of scientific production we specify a nonlinear 
single-equation econometric model of the number of articles per researcher, AP, in which we 
include the following explanatory variables: 
 
ARE: the ratio of basic research expenditure to the number of researchers; 
 
RE: expenditure on basic research; 
 
2RE : squared value of RE; 
 
N: number of researchers in basic research; 
 
2N : squared value of N; 
 
SI: expenditure on basic research made by other countries. 
 
Variables derive from data on: Higher Education Researchers, source OECD; Academic R&D 
Expenditure in USA $ at constant 1995 prices, source OECD8. 
We specify the basic equation to test the hypotheses 1-3. The first step is to estimate the relation 
between size and output in the science sector. We are thus able to evaluate the presence of 
nonlinearities and identify the sections of the curve where returns are increasing or decreasing. The 
quadratic term in this equation allows us to verify the existence of a threshold effect in the size 
                                                 
8 The number of higher education researchers by field is unavailable. Hence, we calculated this variable by the product 
of the aggregate number of researchers by the share of R&D expenditure of each field. 
variable. If the function of average productivity is U shaped, then we know that there is a minimum 
size above which increasing returns emerge. 
In regression equations we alternate the variables N and RE as proxies of the size of the sector. The 
variable ARE approximates the average amount of resources that each researcher can count on in 
his/her job. It is meant to proxy for salaries that should provide incentives for the participants in 
scientific contests. The choice of this indicator depends on the lack of international data on wages 
in basic research.  
In the second step we concentrate on estimating the contribution to scientific production of 
externalities deriving from social interactions. We use in regressions the following indicators: SI 
research expenditure in the same field made by other countries; RE research expenditure in other 
fields in the same country. The first variable is a proxy of scientific interactions which occur among 
scientists within the same field but across countries. The other variable is a classic proxy of 
knowledge spillovers, used in any econometric study of industrial R&D (e.g. Nadiri and 
Shankerman, 1989). It could also account for social interactions among researchers of affine fields. 
As common in analyses of scientific production (e.g. Adams and Griliches, 2000), we assume a 
dynamic model to account for the complexity of the process of basic research. A general ADL 
version of the basic equation used in estimates looks like: 
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where iη  denotes country dummies and tiu ,  is a random i.i.d. perturbation. However, we are 
interested in the long-run determinants of basic research output whose importance can be 
appreciated by the long-run multipliers: 
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Direct estimation of eq. (8) is hindered by problems of collinearity among regressors and does not 
provide multipliers. Hence, we follow Wickens and Breusch (1988) who suggest several 
reformulations of the ADL equation that allow direct estimation of long-run effects. In particular, 
we chose the following reformulation: 
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which can be obtained by subtracting ∑
=
m
l
ltiAP
1
, α from each side of eq. (6). 
 
3.2 Empirical results 
 
Estimation of eq. (7) provides the same long-run multipliers as those obtainable from the ADL eq. 
(6) when the estimation method is Instrumental Variables with the set of instruments given by all 
the explanatory variables in the original equation (Wickens and Breusch, 1988). We adopted this 
strategy for several specifications of eq. (6). 
A first-order autoregression of residuals provides a test of the null hypothesis of absence of 
autocorrelation that is invariant to the transformation of the perturbation tiu , . After some 
preliminary regressions we chose a one-year lag for all equation specifications except one which 
required a lag of two years. The results presented in tables 1-3 show a very good fit of the estimated 
equations and the absence of error autocorrelation. Table 1 presents the parameters of the basic 
equation (7) estimated on data for the sum of five scientific fields: engineering, medicine; 
agriculture; natural sciences; social sciences. The first column refers to the relation between 
average number of articles and size of the sector. Parameters of the number of researchers are both 
significant and lend support to the existence of a U relation with AP. Hence, the results confirm our 
hypothesis concerning the presence of a threshold above which larger scientific sectors imply 
greater productivity of researchers. The variable ARE which is a proxy for wages, enters this 
equation with a parameter that is not significant. The aggregate value of this variable may well not 
approximate for scientists' salaries, while other kinds of effects could be captured by the size 
variable. 
The third column in table 1 presents parameters of the same equation augmented with SI the 
amount of research expenditure made by other countries. This variable enters the equation with a 
significant positive parameter, meaning that there is a positive social interactions effect in scientist 
productivity. Hence, research carried out by individuals in different countries flows to the 
international community through several channels. Of interest is also the analysis of country fixed 
effects which can be interpreted with reference to the influence of factors specific to the national 
organisation of science. Indeed, both regressions in table 1 show a clear hierarchy among the seven 
advanced countries considered. USA and Japan present the highest value of fixed effects followed 
by Germany and the UK, while Italy and Canada occupy the lowest position in the ranking. 
Hence, although our model captures significant features of scientific production in these countries, 
it shows that there are other important phenomena such as the traditional involvement in research, 
the production of human capital, etc. captured by country-dummies. 
Table 2 presents the regression results for engineering and medicine where the proxy variable of 
the size is the amount of research expenditure RE. We also investigated the effects of research 
carried out in other fields in the same country. Both these regressions show many significant 
parameters, high goodness of fit and the lack of residual autocorrelation. The relation between size 
and scientist productivity found for all fields is confirmed in these two cases. Also, there is 
confirmation of the strong statistical significance of the research efforts by other countries, even at 
the field level. The novelty with respect to the aggregate estimates is made by the investigation of 
relations with other fields. In this respect, we found a negative and significant effect of research 
performed in natural sciences on productivity both in engineering and in medicine, revealing that in 
these cases the competition effect prevails, which is probably due to the overlapping of issues 
investigated.  
Country-fixed effects tell us that in these two fields the USA has a much more productive research 
system than others. The high value of the parameter for France in medicine confirms what is well 
known: the established tradition of this country in the field.  
In table 3 the estimated parameters of article production in social sciences and natural sciences are 
shown. Even though the equation of the first field presents a high goodness of fit, it shows worse 
results than those found in previous regressions. Variables that approximate for social exchange do 
not enter the equation with significant parameters. This result comes as no great surprise since this 
field contains distinct disciplines as literature and law that are naturally rooted in the culture of each 
country.  
However, the non-linear relation between size RE and output is confirmed by significant 
coefficients, meaning that other causes of increasing returns may be relevant in the field. 
 The third column in table 3 shows the results of the regression on data of natural sciences. In this 
case, the best specification is that without country dummy variables. Most of the variables enter the 
equation with significant parameters. Size and productivity show the same relation as before. Quite 
interestingly, there is a negative effect of the research in the field done by researchers in other 
countries, meaning that the competition effect prevails over those of social interactions. Also of 
interest is the positive linkage between research output in natural sciences and research expenditure 
in medicine. In this case, it seems that medicine provides the field of natural sciences with 
knowledge which is more basic and positively affects its scientific production. 
It can be noted that in regressions by field the variable ARE always assumes significant and positive 
estimated parameters. Hence, it seems that the average amount of resources per researcher at field 
level provides a good approximation of the monetary incentives for scientists' productivity. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we addressed the question of the presence of increasing returns in scientific 
production due to the effect of social interactions. Econometric analysis of data on publications of 
scientists in seven advanced countries in the fields of engineering, medicine, natural sciences and 
social sciences in the period 1988-2001 shows a nonlinear model that describes a U-shaped relation 
between articles per scientist and size of the basic research. Scientists' productivity is positively 
affected by the research carried out in other countries in the same field. Interactions among fields 
also arise from the regression results, hinting at the importance of knowledge exchanges due to 
social interactions also among researchers working in different fields. 
These results provide quantitative information on the effects of social interactions in academic 
research and on the conditions for increasing returns. The reason for the emergence of increasing 
returns only in an aggregate level should be investigated by further research on the specific ways in 
which scientists interact in the community. Existing research on Invisible Colleges may provide 
several insights into the issue that could be tested with more appropriate data. Moreover, this 
phenomenon still requires theoretical analysis in greater depth that could benefit from the applied 
research.  
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Table 1- Regressions of the number of articles per researcher. Four fields of science 
 
Dependent var. AP Parameter Student’s t Parameter Student’s t 
 (1)*  (2)**  
APt – APt-1 -7.075 -3.32 -5.334 -3.57 
AREt – AREt-1 0.148 2.21 0.110 3.30 
AREt -0.018 -0.87 -0.037 -1.93 
Nt – Nt-1 -1.091 -2.90 -0.824 -2.91 
Nt -0.350 -3.75 -0.434 -4.88 
N2t – N2t-1 0.026 2.96 0.019 2.96 
N2t 0.007 3.22 0.009 4.36 
SIt – SIt-1   0.001 0.47 
SIt   0.001 2.01 
USA 5.242 4.33 5.834 5.67 
JAP 4.512 3.98 4.758 5.25 
GER 2.908 3.99 2.905 5.17 
CAN 1.884 4.09 1.744 4.93 
ITA 2.004 3.66 1.832 4.42 
FRA 2.507 3.87 2.443 4.93 
UK 2.655 4.51 2.615 5.79 
R2 0.79  0.87  
ρ -0.136 -1.29 -0.133 -1.24 
Observations 91  91  
 
* The estimation method is Instrumental Variables with instruments given by the dummy variables and the variables 
ARE, N, N2 taken at the time t and t-1; three time-dummy variables have been included; ρ is the parameter of a first-
order autoregression of residuals. 
** The estimation method is Instrumental Variables with instruments given by the dummy variables and the variables 
ARE, N, N2, SI taken at the time t and t-1; three time-dummy variables have been included; ρ is the parameter of a first-
order autoregression of residuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2- Regressions of the number of articles per researcher. Engineering and Medicine. 
 
Dependent var. AP Parameter Student’s t Parameter Student’s t 
 Engineering*  Medicine**  
APt – APt-1 -3.811 -2.88 -6.087 -3.24 
AREt – AREt-1 0.255 2.87 0.563 3.19 
AREt 0.089 7.23 0.118 6.31 
REt – REt-1 -0.557 -2.68 -0.354 -2.45 
REt -0.183 -4.01 -0.131 -3.14 
RE2t – RE2t-1 0.007 2.43 0.002 1.83 
RE2t 0.002 3.45 0.002 3.66 
SIt – SIt-1 -0.006 -0.55 0.016 0.98 
SIt 0.007 2.40 0.008 2.37 
REnat.t – REnat.t-1 0.054 1.64 0.098 1.32 
REnat.t -0.041 -3.13 -0.190 -2.79 
USA 6.557 5.15 15.535 4.27 
JAP 3.022 4.04 3.272 3.55 
GER 1.979 3.99 3.823 3.50 
CAN 0.418 1.36 0.346 0.73 
ITA 0.629 1.75 1.742 2.29 
FRA 1.704 3.57 5.102 3.04 
UK 1.398 3.63 3.965 3.88 
R2 0.89  0.87  
ρ -0.105 -0.93 0.019 0.17 
Observations 91  91  
 
* The estimation method is Instrumental Variables with instruments given by the country dummy variables and the 
variables ARE, RE, RE2, SI, REnat. taken at the time t and t-1; ρ is the parameter of a first-order autoregression of 
residuals. 
** The estimation method is Instrumental Variables with instruments given by the dummy variables and the variables 
ARE, RE, RE2, SI, REnat taken at the time t and t-1; six time-dummy variables have been included; ρ is the parameter 
of a first-order autoregression of residuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3- Regressions of the number of articles per researcher. Social Science and Natural 
Science. 
 
Dependent var. AP Parameter Student’s t Parameter Student’s t 
 Social Science*  Natural Science**  
APt – APt-1 -4.115 -3.75 -20.107 -5.06 
APt – APt-2 1.441 3.20   
AREt – AREt-1 0.015 0.42 0.397 3.26 
AREt – AREt-2 -0.007 -0.27   
AREt -0.009 -0.92 0.056 4.87 
Nt – Nt-1 -1.411 -1.54 -5.263 -3.73 
Nt – Nt-2 0.317 0.55   
Nt -0.740 -3.60 0.491 4.07 
N2t – N2t-1 0.001 1.62 0.004 2.96 
N2t – N2t-2 -0.0002 -0.55   
N2t 0.0005 3.42 -0.0008 -3.05 
SIt – SIt-1   -0.036 -0.71 
SIt   -0.016 -2.00 
REmed.t – Remed.t-1   -0.0001 -0.53 
REmed.t   0.00004 2.02 
USA 250.961 7.84   
JAP 262.387 3.44   
GER 114.111 3.40   
CAN 91.854 3.82   
ITA 62.649 2.57   
FRA 62.679 3.22   
UK 107.99 4.26   
R2 0.97  0.28  
ρ -0.182 -0.017 -0.137 -1.27 
Observations 84  91  
 
* The estimation method is Instrumental Variables with instruments given by the country dummy variables and the 
variables ARE, N, N2, taken at the time t, t-1 and t-2; ρ is the parameter of a first-order autoregression of residuals. 
** The estimation method is Instrumental Variables with instruments given by the dummy variables and the variables 
ARE, N, N2, SI, REmed taken at the time t and t-1; ρ is the parameter of a first-order autoregression of residuals. 
 
 
